From Defense to Strategic Leverage – Egypt Between the Rifle and the Olive Branch

A Reading of the Path of Peace from Nasser to Sisi

By Ali Khalil

From the moment Arab armies were defeated in June 1967, the Arab world has lived in a state of duality — torn between the voice of the rifle and the voice of politics. Egypt — as the heart of Arabism and the balance of the region — stood at the very center of this struggle between the choice of war and the demands of peace.
Through successive leaders, from Nasser to Sisi, the tools and methods have changed, yet the goal has remained constant: to regain the land, preserve sovereignty, and protect the Egyptian state from division or dissolution into the ambitions of others.

From Nasser to Rogers: Between Pride and Maneuver

After the defeat of 1967, Egypt faced an Israeli proposal to return Sinai in exchange for political recognition and limited normalization. President Gamal Abdel Nasser flatly rejected the offer, believing that no sovereignty could be traded for land. To him, peace under occupation was a historical humiliation, and the rifle was the only path to reclaiming dignity.
Yet as the War of Attrition dragged on, the economy weakened, and Soviet support waned, Nasser realized that the battle required patience and a phased plan. Thus, in 1970, he accepted the Rogers Initiative — not as a concession, but as a tactical pause to rebuild the army and prepare for the next round.
Those close to him described that moment as “the warrior’s truce,” not the surrender of the weak.

Sadat: Crossing Toward War, Then Toward Politics

When Anwar Sadat assumed power after Nasser’s death, he inherited a country burdened by crisis — caught between a public yearning for war and global powers pressing for negotiation.
Sadat chose to surprise everyone — by going to war. The October 1973 War transformed the face of the Middle East, restoring Arab confidence after six years of despair.

The great paradox came when Sadat decided to halt further advances beyond the Suez Canal, despite Egypt’s early battlefield success. U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger later quoted Sadat as saying:

“I will not go beyond certain limits. I want a political victory, not a total military one.”

Some military commanders believed this decision cost Egypt a stronger bargaining position later, while Sadat saw deep penetration into Sinai as a trap for prolonged attrition.
In 1977, he made the historic and shocking decision to visit Jerusalem and address the Israeli Knesset — hailed by some as a courageous step to end the cycle of blood, and condemned by others as a betrayal of Arab unity.

Two years later came the Camp David Accords, brokered by U.S. President Jimmy Carter, restoring Sinai to Egypt and granting Israel its first Arab recognition — but at the cost of Egypt’s temporary isolation from the Arab world, led by Saddam Hussein and others.

Though the agreement ended the war, it unleashed an ideological storm that persists today: Did Egypt gain peace, or did it pay the price of Arab disunity?

The mysterious 1981 plane crash that killed Field Marshal Ahmed Badawi and over 40 officers added another layer of suspicion — was Sadat sidelining military leaders opposed to his new political path?

Mubarak: The Cold Peace and the Diplomacy of Patience

After Sadat’s assassination, Hosni Mubarak inherited a fragile peace — complete but cold. He neither canceled nor expanded the treaty, maintaining it as a narrow security framework.
Meanwhile, he gradually reintegrated Egypt into the Arab fold through summits and mediation, restoring trust with capitals that had severed ties after Camp David.

During Mubarak’s era, the treaty functioned more as a border management mechanism than as a surrender document.
He understood that abrogating it would mean another war, and that patience in diplomacy was Egypt’s smartest weapon.
Through this cautious balance, Mubarak supported the Palestinian cause politically and humanitarianly — without engaging in unwinnable wars.

From Upheaval to Balance: Sisi’s Strategic Vision

After the revolutions of 2011 and 2013, Egypt found itself surrounded by terrorism and regional chaos, with shifting alliances across the map. Under President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Cairo adopted a more pragmatic approach to the peace treaty.
Camp David ceased to be a mere political commitment — it became a strategic instrument for safeguarding national security.

Mutual amendments to the treaty’s security annexes allowed expanded Egyptian military deployment in previously restricted zones (B and C). Egyptian forces now operate in Rafah and along the Philadelphi Corridor, equipped with surveillance systems and defensive tunnels to combat terrorism and arms smuggling.

Simultaneously, Cairo maintained open diplomatic channels with both Tel Aviv and Washington, emerging as the primary mediator between Israel and Hamas during multiple G